Hi Laurianna - no problem! We can begin fielding questions from that test, but keep two things in mind at this stage: it's not publicly available yet so we need to be careful how we discuss content (quoting large chunks verbatim, for instance, is a no-no; a truth that holds for other, public tests as well btw), and not a lot of people have a copy yet so you may find the discussions for it to be a
little on the quiet/slow side for now. Once it's more widespread comments and queries will for sure pick up, but don't be alarmed if it feels a bit lonely for a spell
On to 16!
This the question in LR2 about tenants and their electricity bills, correct?
Assuming so, what we have here is a Weaken question, where we'll need an answer choice to provide some additional information that attacks the author's conclusion. Give also that this is question 16—i.e. likely to be on the more difficult end of the LR spectrum—my expectation is that the correct answer probably won't have a hugely detrimental effect. Instead I'm anticipating some new info that introduces a shred of doubt, but doesn't exactly destroy the author's belief!
Let's start with the conclusion. This argument is that if landlords can, and do, begin billing individual tenants for their electricity use (instead of paying for it themselves) it will lead to energy being conserved. In other words, as soon as the landlord is off the hook and tenants are responsible for themselves overall energy consumption drops. Why? Because tenants who don't pay their own electricity bills have no financial incentive to conserve electricity.
It's the old "oh, dinner's on you? Surf 'n turf it is, then!" The assumption being that once people are on the hook for their own behavior, they'll behave better.
How could we weaken that? There are a few broad ideas—prephrases in a way—that could do it:
1. Show that even when tenants do start paying they're still unconcerned with how they use energy. That fits the facts of the stimulus, and essentially shows that even with theoretical cause removed (landlords no longer paying), the effect still occurs (energy used as always). For my surf 'n turf example it would be like saying, "actually, he always orders that meal, regardless of if he's paying or someone else is."
That's pretty simple though, so for a question this deep into the section I'd be shocked to see it as the right answer.
2. We could show something about the mechanics of the proposed plan—installing individual electricity meters—that negates any proposed gains from the plan's outcome. That is, if loads of running meters consume more electricity than is likely to be saved by tenants' attempts at curbing consumption, then the plan may not result in an overall net reduction.
This is a trickier idea that (1) above, and I could theoretically see it happening (they test it plenty), but it's not present in this particular question.
3. We could show that if the landlords are no longer responsible for energy costs, it leads to some other higher-energy outcome. Maybe landlords paying electric bills disable all the building's lights from midnight to 6 am, or lock the thermostats at 76 degrees year-round, or only allow hot water to run for an hour window each day, or...well you get the idea. If them being no longer responsible removes some prior energy-reducing feature, something that tenants may not reintroduce, then even with tenants trying to be more energy-conscious we still may not get an overall conservation.
And sure enough, this is it! Answer choice (C) tells us that when landlords foot the bill they have a strong incentive to install energy efficient appliances. What does that suggest then when landlords no longer pay? They may not install those same energy efficient appliances, meaning tenants move in, are paying the bills...but even with their best efforts and intentions electricity usage may still not be as low as it would have been with freewheeling tenants using low-energy appliances (the landlord paying scenario). The conclusion, in other words, may not hold true.
Notice the number of instances of "may" in that paragraph above. That's what I mean by softer weaken.
Question 16 weaken. It's not nearly as straightforward, as directly adversarial, as what you tend to see in earlier, easier questions, but the rule of weaken is simply this: the answer that introduces more doubt than the other four, even if it only makes the argument 1% less likely, is correct.
None of the other answers give us a reason to think that the plan of moving from landlord-pay to tenant-pay may not reduce electricity usage the way the author thinks, so (C), despite its relative tameness, wins.
I hope that helps!
Jon
