- Wed Mar 16, 2022 11:35 am
#94280
The reason the two premises cannot be combined to get to the conclusion, cgs174, is because one premises is about percentages ("generally" means more than half the time, a percentages concept) and the other is about numbers ("more frequently" just means a larger number, without expressing any percentages or other comparisons to a total). Having more of one kind than the other does not support the claim that the first kind is more likely to have that characteristic. What if there are billions of small observational studies, and only 5% have dramatic findings, while there are just a dozen large randomized trials and all of them have dramatic findings? We could publish all the large randomized results and still publish far more results from small observational studies. Their higher frequency would tell you nothing about the odds of them being dramatic!
So, your reason for rejecting answer D based on there being nothing in the argument about raw numbers was where you went astray. Although no specific numbers were given, the concept of numbers (as opposed to the concept of percentages) WAS an essential element of the argument and was the source of the flaw.
Beware of arguments that try to combine claims about likelihood/probability/rate/incidence, etc. (percentages) with claims about frequency/amount (numbers). Without more data, like the relative sizes of the groups being compared, we may be unable to draw any valid conclusions!
Adam M. Tyson
PowerScore LSAT, GRE, ACT and SAT Instructor
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