#12 - Concept Reference, Must Be True

[bli2016]

For this question, I chose C but upon review, I see the evidence for D in lines 27-29 ("Greater expertise appears to change not only our knowledge of the area as a whole, but our very perception of entities in that area"). So I just wanted to clarify why C is wrong... originally I saw lines 35-41 as evidence for C ("From a psychological perspective... This failure leads naturally to the supposition that there is no way for us to be wrong in our identification of what we ourselves think because we believe we are perceiving it directly") but upon rereading those sentences, I notice that the answer C points to an increased tendency to ignore one's own errors in judgment, whereas the passage is pointing to one's tendency to ignore our fallible knowledge of own our thoughts. Is this distinction between thoughts and judgment the key? Thanks!

[Jonathan Evans]

Yes, Bli, I concur that this distinction is key, because as you noted the evidence cited concerns a perception about the process of thinking rather than any error in the thought itself. Does this make sense?

[bli2016]

Makes perfect sense now, thanks! It was just a really challenging passage for me, I think.

[lanereuden]

So the reason E is wrong is that ?

[ser219]

I am having trouble understanding the distinction listed above so I would greatly appreciate any clarification. I also picked C because of lines 35-41. I also initially liked D but decided again it because I thought that the point was that the experts way of understanding was not actually different but they thought it was because it became so easy to make inferences. Again, any help or clarification on this would be greatly appreciated!

Also, I had trouble eliminating A so if someone could explain why A is wrong that would be awesome

[KelseyWoods]

Ok let's look at some of these incorrect answer choices!

Lanereuden--Answer choice (E) is actually the opposite of what the passage suggests. In the last paragraph, lines 47-52, the author states "the psychologists suggest that we are somehow able to base our inferences about what we are thinking on internal cognitive activity that is not itself thought--e.g., fleeting and instantaneous sensations and emotions." So, basically, experts have an increased reliance on these sensations and emotions such that they make these inferences so quickly that they don't even notice they're making inferences (lines 35-38).

Ser219--Answer choice (C) discusses "a tendency to ignore errors in judgment," but this isn't actually what the passage discusses. The passage doesn't discuss judgment errors or the ignoring of judgment errors. Instead, the passage suggests that experts think that their knowledge of their own thoughts is infallible. Check out the example of the chess experts in lines 33-34. Chess experts claim that they are assessing positions without calculation, but the psychologists would argue that the chess experts are just making these calculations so quickly that they don't even realize they're making them. So it's not that the chess experts are making errors in judgment and then ignoring them; rather, the chess experts do not fully comprehend their own thought process.

Answer choice (A) is again focusing on judgments within the field. It's not that experts express their judgments differently, it's that they express their thinking process (or how they came to make those judgments) differently. They believe it's direct and instantaneous, rather than super fast inferences.

Answer choice (D) is correct because experts do have a substantively different way of understanding relations in that field--even if they just perceive that they are making connections directly rather than making super fast inferences, experts still fail to notice their inferential thoughts and come to believe that there is no way that they can be wrong in their identification of what they think.

Hope this helps!

Best,
Kelsey

[nhlsat1234567]

While I understand that (D) is supported by the passage, I cannot figure out how (C) is not supported. I’ll provide my best explanation, and please let me know where I’m going wrong:

TLDR:
The passage states that losing recognition of the inferences underlying one’s own metacognition leads to a belief of infallibility in said metacognition. The passage also states that when people become experts in a field, a similar obliviousness to inferences underlying their own judgments/perceptions occurs. It follows that these experts must then believe in a similar infallibility of their “perceptions” (for they don’t realize their really inferences). Without a belief that one could be wrong, becoming an expert in a field must definitionally bring about “an increased tendency to ignore one's own errors in judgment within that field.”

In the chess example: Kelsey says: “So it's not that the chess experts are making errors in judgment and then ignoring them; rather, the chess experts do not fully comprehend their own thought process.” Well yes, but this makes them think their judgements are infallible and thus ignore when their wrong as it does with human self-awareness.


Full Version:

I’ll break this into two parts:

A) The passage states that we are so accustomed to making inferences about what we’re thinking that we no longer recognize that such judgements are based on inference. Thus, we come to believe that what we think we are thinking is “noninferential and infallible.” For instance, if we believe we're angry, we’d say it’s because we are indeed angry, not because we’re inferring we’re angry from signals as we would with another individual. By contrast, we recognize that our belief in what others are thinking is based on inference and may not always be accurate. I realize that even if I think Bob is angry, he might actually be happy (perhaps he has a naturally angry face).

B) The passage also suggests the loss of recognition of our own inferential thinking is analogous to that of experts in a field. That is, these experts no longer realize they are making inferences in their activities (say chess players inferring the strength of a position based on the location of pieces). They abstract away from the basic (the chess pieces on the board) and it “appears to [them]” that they perceive the next level directly (strength or weakness of chess setups). Since such experts believe these are their own perceptions and not inferences, they lose the recognition of inferentiality and fallibility in said “perceptions.” In much the same way we don’t believe we can think we’re angry when we’re not, an expert chess player doesn’t believe he/she can think a position is strong when it indeed isn’t — to them they just know it is strong even without calculation. But importantly it could actually be weak as they could have errored in their inferences, but they would not realize or catch this error.
Therefore, it follows directly from the explanation in the passage that these experts will tend to overlook (or “ignore”) their own errors in judgement because they do not even recognize that such errors could arise. This is exactly answer choice (C). Yes, its confusing because we’re dealing with meta-cognition and (in my opinion) a relatively difficult analogy to work with. And yes, you can choose to buy or not to buy the passage’s argument. I personally find it confusing. But nonetheless, I believe the statements in paragraph 2 suggest that answer choice (C) should be correct.

Extra Example:

I think another different (maybe helpful) example would be to think of an archer lining up a shot. The novice may go through a routine (look at the target, see if the arrow is notched, check the sights, etc.) and then infer/calculate that he is lined up for the shot and shoot. If he misses, he’ll figure out where he went wrong since he knows that it’s unlikely everything was perfect in his calculations/inferences.
By contrast, the expert marksman would be in the habit of drawing and firing and from muscle memory would just “feel” or “perceive” or “know” that he was aligned. To him if it felt right, there would be no way that is wrong (again if you think you’re angry doesn’t that mean you are angry?). But that muscle memory is really just an inference based on a lot of factors, and it could be wrong even if he doesn’t realize it could. Perhaps he didn’t notch the arrow correctly or he was wearing the wrong eyeglasses. While he was actually inferring that his shot was true, he thinks he was directly observing / perceiving that it was and doesn’t think that could be wrong.
As such, he may blame a wind gust or some external factor — again to him, there is no way he was wrong in aiming as he “perceived” he was correct and has no belief that he could be wrong. Thus, he has developed a tendency to ignore errors in his own judgement. That doesn’t mean the novice is a better shot or makes fewer judgement errors, but rather that the novice recognizes there are many things entering into his calculation that could have gone wrong while the expert has abstracted that away.

Final Thoughts:
Please let me know where you think this explanation falls short. I’m genuinely curious and have spent a while thinking about this question. Thanks!

[srusty]

While I understand that (D) is supported by the passage, I cannot figure out how (C) is not supported. I’ll provide my best explanation, and please let me know where I’m going wrong:

TLDR:
The passage states that losing recognition of the inferences underlying one’s own metacognition leads to a belief of infallibility in said metacognition. The passage also states that when people become experts in a field, a similar obliviousness to inferences underlying their own judgments/perceptions occurs. It follows that these experts must then believe in a similar infallibility of their “perceptions” (for they don’t realize their really inferences). Without a belief that one could be wrong, becoming an expert in a field must definitionally bring about “an increased tendency to ignore one's own errors in judgment within that field.”

In the chess example: Kelsey says: “So it's not that the chess experts are making errors in judgment and then ignoring them; rather, the chess experts do not fully comprehend their own thought process.” Well yes, but this makes them think their judgements are infallible and thus ignore when their wrong as it does with human self-awareness.


Full Version:

I’ll break this into two parts:

A) The passage states that we are so accustomed to making inferences about what we’re thinking that we no longer recognize that such judgements are based on inference. Thus, we come to believe that what we think we are thinking is “noninferential and infallible.” For instance, if we believe we're angry, we’d say it’s because we are indeed angry, not because we’re inferring we’re angry from signals as we would with another individual. By contrast, we recognize that our belief in what others are thinking is based on inference and may not always be accurate. I realize that even if I think Bob is angry, he might actually be happy (perhaps he has a naturally angry face).

B) The passage also suggests the loss of recognition of our own inferential thinking is analogous to that of experts in a field. That is, these experts no longer realize they are making inferences in their activities (say chess players inferring the strength of a position based on the location of pieces). They abstract away from the basic (the chess pieces on the board) and it “appears to [them]” that they perceive the next level directly (strength or weakness of chess setups). Since such experts believe these are their own perceptions and not inferences, they lose the recognition of inferentiality and fallibility in said “perceptions.” In much the same way we don’t believe we can think we’re angry when we’re not, an expert chess player doesn’t believe he/she can think a position is strong when it indeed isn’t — to them they just know it is strong even without calculation. But importantly it could actually be weak as they could have errored in their inferences, but they would not realize or catch this error.
Therefore, it follows directly from the explanation in the passage that these experts will tend to overlook (or “ignore”) their own errors in judgement because they do not even recognize that such errors could arise. This is exactly answer choice (C). Yes, its confusing because we’re dealing with meta-cognition and (in my opinion) a relatively difficult analogy to work with. And yes, you can choose to buy or not to buy the passage’s argument. I personally find it confusing. But nonetheless, I believe the statements in paragraph 2 suggest that answer choice (C) should be correct.

Extra Example:

I think another different (maybe helpful) example would be to think of an archer lining up a shot. The novice may go through a routine (look at the target, see if the arrow is notched, check the sights, etc.) and then infer/calculate that he is lined up for the shot and shoot. If he misses, he’ll figure out where he went wrong since he knows that it’s unlikely everything was perfect in his calculations/inferences.
By contrast, the expert marksman would be in the habit of drawing and firing and from muscle memory would just “feel” or “perceive” or “know” that he was aligned. To him if it felt right, there would be no way that is wrong (again if you think you’re angry doesn’t that mean you are angry?). But that muscle memory is really just an inference based on a lot of factors, and it could be wrong even if he doesn’t realize it could. Perhaps he didn’t notch the arrow correctly or he was wearing the wrong eyeglasses. While he was actually inferring that his shot was true, he thinks he was directly observing / perceiving that it was and doesn’t think that could be wrong.
As such, he may blame a wind gust or some external factor — again to him, there is no way he was wrong in aiming as he “perceived” he was correct and has no belief that he could be wrong. Thus, he has developed a tendency to ignore errors in his own judgement. That doesn’t mean the novice is a better shot or makes fewer judgement errors, but rather that the novice recognizes there are many things entering into his calculation that could have gone wrong while the expert has abstracted that away.

Final Thoughts:
Please let me know where you think this explanation falls short. I’m genuinely curious and have spent a while thinking about this question. Thanks!

Hi N,

Completely see what you mean, and thanks for providing so much insight into your approach to this problem. Answer choice (C) is unfortunately a really good trap answer. While it is correct that experts make errors - the chess experts can perceive the game board without calculation. However, the failure is about *noticing* the judgments made, not that they are actually making errors in the field. We are not told that experts overlook errors, just that experts overlook the inferences they make. Hope this helps!