#18 - Concept Reference, Must Be True

[Administrator]

Please post your questions below!

[sodomojo]

Where is the support from Passage A for answer choice (D)?

I'm assuming it's somewhere in the first paragraph as that's the only bit that is anti-judicial candor from what I am seeing. But does the author really imply/believe that bit? Because that entire paragraph really just seems to be background information for the opposing viewpoint, not the author's.

[Jennifer Janowsky]

Hi!

You are correct that in much of passage A, the author seems to merely state others' opinions and not his own. However, their reference to others' opinions against judicial candor make it clear that they understand there could be some positive benefits to others' beliefs. The answer choice doesn't ask if he agrees that a lack of candor is overall a better option, but rather whether they believe that a lack of judicial candor "could conceivably have positive benefits under certain circumstances." Hope that helps!

[joewoo198256]

Hi!

You are correct that in much of passage A, the author seems to merely state others' opinions and not his own. However, their reference to others' opinions against judicial candor make it clear that they understand there could be some positive benefits to others' beliefs. The answer choice doesn't ask if he agrees that a lack of candor is overall a better option, but rather whether they believe that a lack of judicial candor "could conceivably have positive benefits under certain circumstances." Hope that helps!

I still don' t understand. I read Passage A again and again and I still couldn't find even a sniff of evidence indicating lack of judicial candor can have some positive benefits, even in the first paragraph introducing the opinion of some theorist against judicial candor. Can someone help please???

[Adam Tyson]

It's hard to detect, joewoo198256, that's for sure! That's part of what made this one of the hardest RC passages in recent memory.

I think the best bit of evidence that author A acknowledges at least the possibility of benefits flowing from a lack of candor is in his discussion of those legal theorists who say that a "rigid adherence to a norm of sincerity is, they say, naive, foolhardy, and even dangerously utopian" (lines 7-9). He never disagrees with those theorists directly, but only speaks about how best to defend such a rule, so he leaves some room for the possibility that some judicial dishonesty might be beneficial in some cases.

Then, there's this at lines 12-15: "If it can be shown that following a general rule favoring sincerity produces the most prudential outcomes—whatever those happen to be—then the rule is justified." The fact that the author starts this with an "if" leaves us with the idea that the author is not absolutely convinced that judicial candor does always lead to the best outcomes. By negative implication, then, he at least concedes that some dishonesty might sometimes lead to better outcomes than honesty would.

It's thin, but in this case it's the only answer with even thin support from both authors, so we have to pick it, as painful as that may feel!

[chian9010]

After reread, I understand where author A mentioned the positive benefits. However, what about author B? I couldn't find where author B mentions the positive benefit of lacking judicial candor.

[Adam Tyson]

Look here, beginning at line 51, chian9010:

Do these points demonstrate that candor is an unshakable obligation of judicial behavior? Do they rebut the argument that judicial deception is warranted in cases where it yields some net benefit? Probably not.

In other words, the author thinks that at least sometimes, judicial deception (which would require a lack of candor) is warranted because it has benefits. We don't know what those circumstances or benefits might be, because the author gives us no examples, but he is clearly of the opinion that there can, sometimes, be a net benefit to deception over candor.

[CPA2lawschool]

Hi all,

Very annoying correct answer here given LSAT's emphasis on separating viewpoints during analysis of the passage, but I digress.

Question regarding incorrect answer B:

The example, as argued by proponents of greater candor, given by Author A (lines 16-19) tells us that transparent decision making (judicial candor) provides better guidance to lower courts and litigants.

AC B: (A LACK of judicial candor would) provide litigants with insufficient guidance.

"Insufficient" is defined as "inadequate, or not enough".

Is AC B incorrect because 1) transparency leading to "better" guidance does not necessarily mean that there was insufficient guidance to begin with, and/or 2) because passage B does not reference "litigants" and therefore cannot be inferred to have implied this?

Thanks!

[James Finch]

Hi CPA,

(B) fails because the lines in passage A (16-19) where guidance is mentioned as a potential benefit of judicial guidance are not the author's viewpoint, but rather part of the author's summary of the points made by proponents of judicial candor for prudential reasons. In, fact it's explicitly argued as one of the prudential reasons. However, the last paragraph of A tells us that its author disagrees with the "prudential reasons" argument, and believes judicial candor should be argued for on moral, not prudential grounds. This means that while it is possible that the author does believe that lack of candor provides insufficient guidance, we do know he or she disagrees with that entire line of argumentation, so we can't infer their opinion about any of its individual premises. We simply aren't given enough information to say that answer choice (B) is correct, which makes it incorrect in this instance.

Hope this clears things up!

[ShannonOh22]

To phrase the question as "each author implies" is particularly insidious, even for the writers of the LSAT.

There is no part of passage A in which the author actually implies any conceivable benefits of lack of judicial candor...all author A does is neglect to disagree with the the proponents of prudential reasoning.

The fact that he starts his sentence with "If"(ln.3) isn't meant to be read as a possible concession or implication to the contrary - it follows directly from the preceding premise "The first [way to defend the principle] is to marshal prudential reasons that support the principle." There could have been a colon used here, as it seems the author is quoting one of the reasons.

Still not convinced that D is defensible at all...but I don't make the rules, so I will retreat in a silent rage and just try to remember these questions are not developed for the faint of heart.