#15 - Editorial: The threat of harsh punishment for a

[glasann]

Hi - I had trouble between deciding between B and E. Can you please provide some color around how you'd attack this question?

I understand that B more builds that 'bridge' to the new info spotted in the conclusion. However if we're saying that feelings of guilt reduces the likelihood that someone will commit a transgression, wouldn't it have to be true that you have to be capable of feeling guilt?

Is it that "MAY" word that in the conclusion that removes the necessity for a blanket statement like E? and then the "everyone" in E takes it too far?

thanks!

[Jeremy Press]

Hi glasann,

You're exactly right that answer choice E is too strong in the sweeping "everyone" that it uses. Not only is it too strong to be necessary for the conclusion, but it's too strong to be necessary for the causal scenario in the premises. After all, the author only says that threats of harsh punishment usually decrease tendency to feel guilt or shame. So it's true that a substantial number of people have to have a tendency to feel such feelings. But it's entirely possible there could be some people who are not subject to that tendency to feel guilt or shame.

Notice that there's also likely a problem with applying the generalization in answer choice E to the specific instance of "extremely severe transgressions," because we can't be entirely sure that those are the specific transgressions the author has in mind when creating a connection between threats of punishment and feelings of guilt or shame. Does the author tell us whether threats of harsh punishment are employed for extremely severe transgressions? Not directly, so we don't have to assume anything about that specific class of transgressions.

I hope this helps!

Jeremy

[Agent00729]

Hi, I have a question about this problem. I understand how B builds the bridge, but don’t see how it’s necessary. Couldn’t the bridge instead have been built from one of the other parts of the scenario? Maybe that decreases in guilt amplify people ignoring welfare of others?

Thanks!

[Jeremy Press]

Hi Agent00729,

I see where you're going with this, but what that would do is render irrelevant the second premise ("the tendency to feel guilt or shame for committing a transgression reduces a person’s tendency to commit transgressions"). If you built the bridge from the element you mention, you don't need that second premise in the argument at all. Supporter Assumption questions don't "jump over" a premise like that (I don't think I've ever seen one that does). For example, check out PT 50, September 2006, LR1, question 16. It's got a premise chain similar to this one where the author assumes that the last link of that premise chain is being tied to the "new information" in the conclusion. Could you have "jumped the chain" by ignoring the last premise? I suppose. But doing that doesn't fit with what the author is assuming. In other words, authors assume that all their premises are relevant. So the bridge-building we should be doing in an Assumption question should take that into account. Now, if this were a Justify question, I'd be fine with the answer choice "jumping over" a piece of the chain (because the conclusion would still be proven, which is all we want from a Justify question). But this isn't a Justify question. Does that clarify?

Hopefully so!

[Agent00729]

Yes, that clears it up! Thanks for the explanation.

[Adam354]

I got tied up by C.
The mistake was
Just because people who are concerned about threats to their own well being tend to be less concerned about the wellfare of others in relation to transgressions (whether or not we are talking about transgressions that have been committed or will be committed) we cannot necessarily apply that sample of people to the population, and state that all people including those not considering or committing transgressions will be less concerned about others if threatened.

I'm still a bit caught up on the correct answer B, so will work through it now:
At least some actions that involve ignoring the others are transgressions.
Okay, in theory I suppose this is true, since if A tends to correlate with B, then A tending to correlate with B is therefore possible.
I was tied up on the fact that, we couldn't assume that any transgressions have actually occurred.
Darn

[Beth Hayden]

Hi Adam,

Well, we don't really know anything about people concerned about threats to their own well-being. Sure, being threatened with harsh punishment is probably going to impact your well-being, but the argument never addresses that relationship, and we still don't know whether these people are actually concerned about it or not. So (C) can't be correct as a necessary assumption because the argument doesn't ever address people who are concerned about threats to their own well-being, it just talks about people who tend to ignore the welfare of others. We have no idea if those two traits are connected in any way.

You don't really need to worry about whether a transgression has or hasn't happened yet, the statement is about the impact of harsh punishments as a deterrent and analyzes how the threat of punishment impacts behavior. The problem here is that the conclusion brings up this idea of ignoring the welfare of others, but there is no premise that sheds any light on that. How can we figure out how legal penalties impact whether or not you ignore the welfare of others? Answer choice (B) fills that gap by linking the premise about committing transgressions with welfare of others. If you assume that some "transgressions" are at the expense of the welfare of other people, the conclusion suddenly makes sense.

I hope that helps!
Beth