#25 - Specific Reference, Must Be True, Purpose/Function

[olimcc20]

Is this entire third paragraph just referring to the perspective of the linguists? For example, in the latter half of the section in question, when it states, "...for every aspect of a phenomenon it is applied to, but some would argue, there is nothing inherent in mathematical language..." Is the "some would argue" still referring to the linguists?

Thanks!
Liv

#help

[Adam Tyson]

Good question, olimcc20! It's not entirely clear to me, even after reading it a few times, who those "some" people are. Is it the linguists, or is it scientists who have a view that is similar to the linguists? Or is it some other group of people who might think about things like this?

Ultimately, for the purpose of answering this question, it doesn't matter, because the purpose is still to illustrate the view of the linguists who hold that "the relationship between language and things is purely a matter of agreed-upon conventions, making knowledge tenuous, relative, and inexact." The author does that by explaining their position and using a discussion of the sciences as an example. Whose view is it? Doesn't matter. Why did the author include that view? To explain the view of those linguists.

[Catallus]

How does the application of some linguists' theory to science and math ("Certainly this characterization would seem applicable to the sciences") serve the purpose of elaborating those linguists' position? I was uncertain about (B), and leaned toward (E), because (B) seems only to address the first half of the paragraph, which definitely does elaborate the linguists' view, without addressing the second half, which connects/applies that view to mathematics, thus seemingly moving beyond the discussion of the linguists to address the author's own position. Further, regarding (E), why doesn't applying the linguists' viewpoint to mathematics serve the purpose of explaining the theory that math can be considered a language? Is it because the third paragraph is really about the "relationship between language and what it refers to" rather than the question of what makes math a language in the first place?

[Robert Carroll]

Catallus,

What answer choice (E) says already happened in the first paragraph of the passage. After that came an introduction to two theories of language. So when the third paragraph talks about a mathematical statement's correctness, the author is applying the second theory to mathematical language. This is not explaining that it may be a kind of language, which already happened, but that it may work out in its domain like language works out in general, according to the second kind of linguistic theory. So the whole paragraph is about that theory.

Are we moving on to the author's own position? The paragraph says "under this view" in its very last sentence. So the author is still explicating a certain view. And that view is how mathematical language can be true because of convention like all language can be true because of convention.

Robert Carroll

[landphil]

Can someone help me understand how the conventionalist linguist understanding equates to believing that "truth is merely a matter of convention?"

I did not select B because I thought jumping to "truth" in general was too far of a leap from talking about how the relationship between things and language is a matter of convention.

[Amber Thomas]

Hi Landphil!

Let's take a look at the two perspectives being debated here, which are introduced in lines 18 through 24:

"The debate centers around whether language corresponds in some essential way to objects and behaviors, making knowledge a solid and reliable commodity; or, on the other hand, whether the relationship between language and things is purely a matter of agreed-upon conventions, making knowledge tenuous, relative, and inexact."

So, we have a perspective that a) language corresponds in an essential and concrete way to objects and behaviors, and b) language is based entirely upon agreed-upon conventions.

Now, let's take a look at Paragraph Three. Paragraph three discusses the latter theory (the theory that language is based entirely upon agreed-upon conventions), and explains it at length. Then, it proceeds to apply this theory to mathematical language.

Answer Choice B states that the primary purpose of Paragraph Three is to: "elaborate the position of linguists who believe that truth is merely a matter of convention."

If we look at the text of Paragraph Three, specifically lines 29 through 32, we can see this exact discussion at play: "These linguists argue that, in the pursuit of knowledge, a statement is true only when there are no promising alternatives that might lead one to question it." The conventionalist theory argues that there is no objective truth when it comes to language, since there can be no concrete and exact correspondence between language and concepts, objects or behaviors. Since the agreed-upon conventions that language is based on are subjective and malleable, there can be no objective truth. This applies in mathematics, where mathematical statements/language are only taken as true so long as there is no compelling indication to question it. Therefore, truth is just a convention, thus making Answer Choice B our correct answer.

Let's take a real world example-- for centuries, it was widely accepted to be true that the smallest object in the universe was a molecule. Then, the atom, a smaller object, was discovered and proven around the 1800s. At this point, the accepted truth of the smallest object in the universe changed. No objective truth changed, only our understanding of conventions.

I hope this helps!