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 Amber Thomas
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#111796
Hi Miriamson!

Answer Choice D states that the author would believe that "An adequate theoretical justification of copyright would likely presuppose that a work’s creator originally owns the ideas embodied in that work."

If we take a look at the text of the last passage, the author takes issue with tangible-object theory, stating that "it does not acknowledge that in many cases the work of conceiving ideas is more crucial and more valuable than that of putting them into tangible form" (Lines 44-47). The author then goes on to describe a scenario where Person A comes up with a poem, dictates it to Person B, and then Person B writes it down-- through tangible-object theory, Person B would be the owner of the poem. The author concludes by stating that Person A would have no ground to claim ownership over the poem unless "[Person A] can be said to already own the ideas expressed in the work" (Lines 52-53).

Recall that the beginning of the passage refers to the concept of justifying copyright, stating that: "copyright and similar intellectual-property rights can be explained as logical extensions of the right to own concrete, tangible objects" (Lines 2-4). The author sets up tangible-object theory as a potential explanation/reason for why copyright protections/laws should exist (i.e. a justification).

We know that our author does not ascribe to the validity of tangible-object theory. Answer Choice D provides a different potential justification for copyright that is more in line with the author's viewpoint.

I hope this helps!
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 miriamson07
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Amber Thomas wrote: Thu Feb 06, 2025 1:57 pm Hi Miriamson!

Answer Choice D states that the author would believe that "An adequate theoretical justification of copyright would likely presuppose that a work’s creator originally owns the ideas embodied in that work."

If we take a look at the text of the last passage, the author takes issue with tangible-object theory, stating that "it does not acknowledge that in many cases the work of conceiving ideas is more crucial and more valuable than that of putting them into tangible form" (Lines 44-47). The author then goes on to describe a scenario where Person A comes up with a poem, dictates it to Person B, and then Person B writes it down-- through tangible-object theory, Person B would be the owner of the poem. The author concludes by stating that Person A would have no ground to claim ownership over the poem unless "[Person A] can be said to already own the ideas expressed in the work" (Lines 52-53).

Recall that the beginning of the passage refers to the concept of justifying copyright, stating that: "copyright and similar intellectual-property rights can be explained as logical extensions of the right to own concrete, tangible objects" (Lines 2-4). The author sets up tangible-object theory as a potential explanation/reason for why copyright protections/laws should exist (i.e. a justification).

We know that our author does not ascribe to the validity of tangible-object theory. Answer Choice D provides a different potential justification for copyright that is more in line with the author's viewpoint.

I hope this helps!
Got it, I was defining “copyright” in an incorrect way — the passage mentions it as having rights, so it makes sense that justifying copyright would mean justifying someone having rights over the IP. Thank you!

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