Hi Capetowner,
First, if you haven't already done so, I'd recommend reading Adam's earlier post (Post #2).
It can be found here:
viewtopic.php?f=795&t=12868
I'm not sure that I"m following your question, so please feel free to elaborate.
In question 17, we're trying to find support for Maritain's view in lines 50-52. Maritain's view is that animals "lack conscious intention" (line 52) when communicating. In other words, animals don't consciously think to themselves, "I'm going to make this noise so that these other animals will understand what I want and then react accordingly;" instead these noises/communications that the animals make is a conditioned reflex, like yawning.
The example of the
Physalaemus frog in Passage A calling even though there is no evidence that it understands the knowledge or desire of other frogs supports Maritain's view because the
Physalaemus frog does not appear to consciously intend to affect the other frogs' behavior. If it is unaware of other frogs' knowledge or desires, it wouldn't consciously intend to affect the other frogs' knowledge or desires; instead, the frog call appears to a conditioned reflex, which also supports Maritain's view.
