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- Fri Jun 03, 2016 1:55 pm
#26104
Passage Discussion
Passage A
To counter a lie with another lie, like responding to a robbery by robbing, is to lower one’s standards. But, like the justice that demands an eye for an eye, this would seem fair on some level. After all, maybe liars forfeit the right to be treated honestly.
The author raises to important questions: First, does a liar have a right to the truth? Second, is it more acceptable to lie to a liar? A harmless but pathological liar would have no right to complain about being lied to, but his harmless lies would not justify lying to the liar. One should also consider how the practice of lying can potentially harm oneself, others, and trust in general.
Passage B
According to Kant, when rational people act immorally toward others, they authorize others to give them the same immoral treatment. To do so would be to treat a person as a rational being, making rational decisions. One might infer from this a duty to provide such fitting treatment, but that would imply a duty to repay every act, good or bad, performed by anyone.
The point, says the author, is that a person’s acts authorize others to do the same to them, but do not compel them to do so. The original actor would have no basis to complain for such treatment, but his acts create a right to treat him in that way, not a duty.
Passage Similarities and Differences
Both passages discuss the issue of how to treat wrongdoers, such as liars. In particular, they both raise the question of whether it is justifiable to treat such wrongdoers with an action of the same kind. Both authors seem to believe that there is some justification in treating wrongdoers the way they treat others, but conclude that inferring a duty to treat wrongdoers in this way would be a mistake.
The two passages reach that conclusion in different ways. Passage A argues that we must consider how the practice of lying can inflict harm on others, whereas Passage B states that if we were compelled to act wrongfully toward wrongdoers, we would also be compelled to repay every other action, good or bad.
Passage A
To counter a lie with another lie, like responding to a robbery by robbing, is to lower one’s standards. But, like the justice that demands an eye for an eye, this would seem fair on some level. After all, maybe liars forfeit the right to be treated honestly.
The author raises to important questions: First, does a liar have a right to the truth? Second, is it more acceptable to lie to a liar? A harmless but pathological liar would have no right to complain about being lied to, but his harmless lies would not justify lying to the liar. One should also consider how the practice of lying can potentially harm oneself, others, and trust in general.
Passage B
According to Kant, when rational people act immorally toward others, they authorize others to give them the same immoral treatment. To do so would be to treat a person as a rational being, making rational decisions. One might infer from this a duty to provide such fitting treatment, but that would imply a duty to repay every act, good or bad, performed by anyone.
The point, says the author, is that a person’s acts authorize others to do the same to them, but do not compel them to do so. The original actor would have no basis to complain for such treatment, but his acts create a right to treat him in that way, not a duty.
Passage Similarities and Differences
Both passages discuss the issue of how to treat wrongdoers, such as liars. In particular, they both raise the question of whether it is justifiable to treat such wrongdoers with an action of the same kind. Both authors seem to believe that there is some justification in treating wrongdoers the way they treat others, but conclude that inferring a duty to treat wrongdoers in this way would be a mistake.
The two passages reach that conclusion in different ways. Passage A argues that we must consider how the practice of lying can inflict harm on others, whereas Passage B states that if we were compelled to act wrongfully toward wrongdoers, we would also be compelled to repay every other action, good or bad.