#25- Must Be True

[ChicaRosa]

I had such a hard time with this passage because the wording of the answer choices didn't exactly reflect the wording of the passage. Anyways, why is answer choice E correct?

I originally picked B but after reviewing it I saw that it didn't reflect in the passage since Dworkin mentions that it's ok for judges to use moral intuition as long as it reflects the internal logic of the law which is in ln 43-44.

I tried looking in the passage about legal positivists misunderstanding moral intuition in legal interpretation but so far in the 2nd paragraph of the passage it only mentions that law and morality are entirely different as well as deriving the meaning of a law through a consensus and not by what's morally right. So is E correct because legal positivists disregard moral intuition?

Thanks!

[Francis O'Rourke]

In the third paragraph, the writer of this passage explains Dworkin's understanding of a judge using moral intuition. Dworkin believes that such usage of fairness or justice (moral concepts), even when there is no consensus, is valid since it rests on the internal logic of society's laws.

The legal positivists hold that law and morality are wholly distinct (Lines 12-14). The author describes in the second paragraph how legal positivists want nothing in law to appeal to morality. The judge would be limited in their view to determining "consensus, or lack thereof" of meaning of a word (line 26). In this view, judges would not be allowed to use moral intuition when it is not supported by consensus.

[avengingangel]

er, i am still a little confused by that explanation. could you please elaborate?

—ALSO: howww is (A) not totally 100% correct ??? i mean lines 27-30 come on

[Francis O'Rourke]

Answer Choice (A) states that Dworkin believes that judges and lawyers act too often as though there is a fact of the matter in legal cases. Lines 27-30 tell us something similar, but different enough that we cannot prove choice (A). We know from these lines that Dworkin believes that judges and lawyers often act in this way, but we do not know if Dworkin thinks that this is too often. In fact, the next sentence tells us he approves of the way that judges and lawyers have acted: "the theory he proposes seeks to validate this practice..."

As for choice (E), Dowrkin's theory as described in the third paragraph uses moral intuitions by requiring judges to consult their own moral intuitions. The legal positivists want morality completely out of the law. From this we can say that they misunderstand the roll of moral intuition in law.