#14 - Principle: Any person or business knowingly aiding

[jk615]

I was between answer choice (D) and (E). (E) confused me because I didn't think that "a service that can be expected to be used to infringe" wasn't supported in the stimulus. I understand why (D) is wrong, because monitoring those facilities is out of scope. But can you explain why (E) is correct? Thanks

[nicholaspavic]

Hi jk,

Great question about this Strengthening Principle question.

And this is a skill that lawyers have to apply all the time when dealing with a law's application and when the wording of a law might be open to interpretation. It's very likely that as lawyers we will all have to, at one point or another, argue for an extension of a law to what is arguably ambiguous circumstances. That's what's happening here. Note that in the principle described, there could be an argument that the department store did not "knowingly aid[] someone’s infringement" because they merely provided a open self-service kiosk to the infringer. In other words, Grandview was not the cause of the infringement, the customer was. That's what Grandview would probably like to argue, if accused of infringement. Here Answer (E) eliminates the infringing customer as the sole cause of the infringement and it justifies the inclusion of the department store as a cause for the infringement. In other words, focus on the causality that the stimulus offers always.

Also, I am not sure that "monitoring" of the kiosk is brought up either in the stimulus or the answer choice. It could be, for example, that Grandview just needs to close the kiosk entirely and thereby end its participation in the infringing activity.

Thanks for the great question and I hope this helped.

[deck1134]

Hi PowerScore,

I hope you are doing well!

I am happy to say I got this right, but I want to make sure I know why all of the answers are wrong. What disqualifies C, posting a notice. I am tempted to say it is out of scope, but could is also be that "notifying" does not mitigate the relationship stressed in the principle?

Thanks!

[Adam Tyson]

Thanks for the question, Deck! Whether the store should or shouldn't post a notice isn't really relevant here, for a couple of reasons. First, and most importantly, whether they should or shouldn't post a notice does nothing to address the crucial element in the principle of whether the store knowingly aided the customer. Second, we don't know from the stimulus whether this store did or didn't post a notice. Maybe they did and it just wasn't mentioned? Without knowing whether they posted a notice, and without connecting that notice requirement to the concept of knowledge, this answer doesn't do anything to support the claim that they are guilty.

Focus on the key element of the principle here, which is " knowingly aiding someone's infringement." When you do, those other answers won't look nearly as good anymore!

[jmacer]

Hi jk,

Great question about this Strengthening Principle question.

And this is a skill that lawyers have to apply all the time when dealing with a law's application and when the wording of a law might be open to interpretation. It's very likely that as lawyers we will all have to, at one point or another, argue for an extension of a law to what is arguably ambiguous circumstances. That's what's happening here. Note that in the principle described, there could be an argument that the department store did not "knowingly aid[] someone’s infringement" because they merely provided a open self-service kiosk to the infringer. In other words, Grandview was not the cause of the infringement, the customer was. That's what Grandview would probably like to argue, if accused of infringement. Here Answer (E) eliminates the infringing customer as the sole cause of the infringement and it justifies the inclusion of the department store as a cause for the infringement. In other words, focus on the causality that the stimulus offers always.

Also, I am not sure that "monitoring" of the kiosk is brought up either in the stimulus or the answer choice. It could be, for example, that Grandview just needs to close the kiosk entirely and thereby end its participation in the infringing activity.

Thanks for the great question and I hope this helped.

Nicholas, I appreciate your prior response as someone who missed this question. One assumption that Choice E makes, which I don't see addressed directly, is the qualifier "...providing a service that can be expected to be used to infringe on copyright...." Your prior reasoning bears out perfectly well if we assume that self-serve photo printing is such a service; however, I struggle to see how the stimulus directly addresses or justifies that leap, minor as it may be. In other words, why should we classify self-serve photo printing as a service "expected to be used to infringe on a copyright"? Obviously, the conclusion of the Grandview's culpability hinges on our choosing to do so.

I can see how E is the best answer available as the others also exhibit clear flaws; it just seems a hefty assumption to make in a correct response. Any thoughts would be well appreciated.

[Rachael Wilkenfeld]

Hi Jmacer,

Good question.

I think your question hinges on the expected use of a self-service kiosk. Do we expect a self-service kiosk to be used to infringe on a copyright?

One way to think about it is this: Was the customer who used the machine to copy a wedding photo engaging in expected normal behavior with that machine? I'd argue yes. No one would be surprised to see someone copying a photo in a copy shop. No one would be surprised to see someone copying a book. These are infringing behaviors that are totally expected and foreseeable. Unexpected behaviors might be using the copy machine to power a cell phone, or to copy a stuffed animal.

Hope that helps,
Rachael

[ronibass]

I was wondering why A was wrong. I chose A because it compared self-service facilities to full-service facilities and I thought that this distinction was necessary since the stimulus was detailing a self-service kiosk. Are you able to tell me where I went wrong in my approach?

[Rachael Wilkenfeld]

Hi ronibass,

Let's focus on the principle here, because it's central to our analysis. Anyone who KNOWINGLY aids someone else's copyright infringement is also guilty.

We know that the store aided someone else's copyright infringement. But what we don't know is how to jump from the fact that there were self-service copying kiosks to the fact that the store KNOWINGLY aided the infringement. We are going to be looking for an answer choices that helps us address that issue.

Answer choice (A) can be eliminated fairly quickly, if only because it's talking about the store's obligations to its customers, not to copyright holders. We aren't worried about the store's relationship to its customers.

Answer choice (E) is correct because it tells us how the store could commit a knowing act when it's the customer who is doing all the copying. The store is deemed to know about the infringement if it's an expected use of their product (self-service machines). This seems likely. If someone wanted to copy something that FedEx refused to copy for them, they'd likely just use a self-service machine.

[LS2021]

I also chose "A" : "The operator of a business has the same legal obligations to customers who use self-service facilities as it has to customers who use full-service facilities."

I understood "legal obligations to customers..." to mean that the operator of a business is legally obligated to the actions of self service customers infringing on copyright, as much as to the actions of plain view customers in full-service facilities infringing on copyright.

Please tell me where I am going wrong with my understanding of this answer choice.

Hi ronibass,

Let's focus on the principle here, because it's central to our analysis. Anyone who KNOWINGLY aids someone else's copyright infringement is also guilty.

We know that the store aided someone else's copyright infringement. But what we don't know is how to jump from the fact that there were self-service copying kiosks to the fact that the store KNOWINGLY aided the infringement. We are going to be looking for an answer choices that helps us address that issue.

Answer choice (A) can be eliminated fairly quickly, if only because it's talking about the store's obligations to its customers, not to copyright holders. We aren't worried about the store's relationship to its customers.

Answer choice (E) is correct because it tells us how the store could commit a knowing act when it's the customer who is doing all the copying. The store is deemed to know about the infringement if it's an expected use of their product (self-service machines). This seems likely. If someone wanted to copy something that FedEx refused to copy for them, they'd likely just use a self-service machine.

[Rachael Wilkenfeld]

Hi LS,

Answer choice (A) is talking about the store's obligations to their customer, or the people who shop at the store. The stimulus is talking about the owner's obligation to someone other than a customer--the copyright holder. Whatever their obligations to customers may be, they wouldn't impact their obligations to non-customers. Answer choice (A) isn't addressing the situation in the stimulus.

Your read might make sense if they had used words like "responsible for" but it still wouldn't have been enough to justify our conclusion. We would still need an answer choice to explain how the store is responsible for actions performed by someone else.

Hope that helps!
Rachael