- Thu Aug 29, 2019 6:41 pm
#67668
Lanereuden,
I went wrong in the exact same place, and after looking it over am still confused. I would structure the interaction something like this:
It reads like the economists only have one view: that the penalty should be informed only by the full/complete reckoning of cost/benefit of committing the crime. The argument proceeds by saying that after full consideration of what a complete reckoning would mean, the view is untenable due to the impracticality of heavy costs that can be fatal to the business and its employees' jobs.
The passage then affirms that the implementation of the approach endorsed by the economists requires that detection ratios be high enough for courts to just ignore them. Doesn't this seem to imply that the economists are at least noncommittal and at most against situations where detection ratios are high enough that courts can't ignore them?
The passage implies that the economists are not fully aware of all the repercussions of their theory, because they operate the theory with outdated values (very high detection ratios); only recent studies suggest much lower and realistic ratios.
So how are we supposed to extrapolate that the economists, who both intended for the 'accurate' high ratios to be ignored by the courts and were very likely ignorant of the recent studies of lower ratios, completely license the new implications/conclusions of their theory in light of the recent studies?
Furthermore, if we take a monotone approach to make A work, we run into problems with also (in my opinion) making D work. Maybe we just say that hey, the economists had a view which exhaustively defined reasonable penalties in a full reckoning of cost/benefit. So, if that full reckoning takes place and businesses turn belly-up, sucks to be the business but their full reckoning took place so therefore the economists must agree with what happened, as their given sufficient conditions for a just penalty have been checked off.
If you take that route, you just have to grant that the economists can agree with certain features/implications of their theory, even if they didn't consciously anticipate or intend them. So then, how would D be wrong? The whole point of including detection ratios in determining penalties is to make continued lawful action the less expensive action. Detection ratios do that by determining penalties with respect to the likelihood of the corporations recommitting a particular crime.
If economists don't agree that the likelihood of corporations recommitting a particular crime should be a main factor in determining the size of the penalty, then how would the passage show that economists agree that the possibility of the corporation going out of business is irrelevant to the penalty, since the mechanism by which the economists would license corporations going out of business just is the inclusion of sensitivity towards the likelihood of corporations recommitting the crime (detection ratios)?
I know it's long, thanks to anyone in advance for reading and responding. Don't be too harsh if I can't see the forest from the trees or something like that..